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249 
COMMENTS 
Mind the Gap: Issues with and Solutions to Oklahoma’s 
Appellate Jurisdiction as Exposed by Lockett v. Evans1 
I. Introduction 
In January 2014, Clayton Lockett and Charles Warner were scheduled 
for execution by the State of Oklahoma.2 As Lockett’s conviction stemmed 
from a robbery, kidnapping, and murder in the summer of 19993 and 
Warner’s originated with convictions of rape and first degree murder in 
1997,4 this appeared to mark the end of a long road for both men. 
Apparently unprepared to concede the field, however, the two men 
launched an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the state’s 
confidentiality provision for death-penalty proceedings.5 The controversial 
appeal brought conversations about cruel and unusual punishment—and the 
merits of the death penalty in general—to the forefront of observers’ minds 
throughout Oklahoma and the nation.  
Despite the uncontested importance of such well-publicized 
humanitarian issues, a second aspect of the Lockett saga offers 
comparative, albeit far more technical, significance. In its run through the 
gamut of Oklahoma courts, the case exposed some shortcomings of the 
state’s appellate system. Unlike most cases, the procedural history of this 
case reads more akin to something out of a John Grisham novel. 
Lockett and Warner initially challenged Oklahoma’s death-penalty 
statute6 on both state and federal constitutional grounds.7 They also moved 
for injunctive relief, seeking to stay their executions.8 Because of the 
federal claims, the case was temporarily removed to federal court, but an 
amendment to the complaint left only challenges on state grounds, sending 
the case back to state court.9 The District Court of Oklahoma County then 
heard the case, but denied the request for a stay of execution, claiming that 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals holds jurisdiction over such a 
                                                                                                                 
 1. (Lockett 4), 2014 OK 34, 330 P.3d 488 (per curium).  
 2. Lockett v. State (Lockett 2), 2014 OK CR 3, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d 755, 755-56. 
 3. Lockett v. State (Lockett 1), 2002 OK CR 30, ¶¶ 1-3, 53 P.3d 418, 421. 
 4. Warner v. State, 2006 OK CR 40, ¶¶ 1-2, 144 P.3d 838, 856. 
 5. Lockett 2, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755-56.  
 6. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1015(B) (2011). 
 7. Lockett 2, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755-56. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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motion.10 Lockett and Warner then filed a petition in error with the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, appealing the denial of the stay of execution.11 
The supreme court, however, affirmed the district court, ruling that only the 
court of criminal appeals could hear the motion for the stay of execution, 
although the supreme court could hear the merits of the action.12  
While it would seem that the matter should be ripe for a decision on the 
merits at this point, that was not yet the case. Although the District Court of 
Oklahoma County ruled that the confidentiality clause did violate the 
inmates’ state constitutional rights, it denied the rest of their claims.13 
Further, the court of criminal appeals denied Lockett and Warner’s 
subsequent motion for a stay of execution, holding it had no authority to 
grant the motion because there was no pending case before it.14 Therefore, 
the petitioners brought another motion for a stay of execution before the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.15 But yet again, the supreme court kept the 
substantive appeal and transferred the stay of execution issue to the court of 
criminal appeals.16 Not to be outdone, the court of criminal appeals also 
denied the stay of execution once more, claiming that the supreme court 
“does not have the power to supersede a statute and manufacture 
jurisdiction in [the court of criminal appeals] for [Lockett and Warner’s] 
stay request by merely transferring it here.”17 
So by April 21, 2014, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma and the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had each refused to hear the motion 
for a stay of execution twice, there was still a substantive appeal before the 
supreme court, and the first execution was scheduled for the following day, 
April 22.18 The supreme court, noting the “awkward position” that the court 
of criminal appeals had left it in, therefore reluctantly agreed to hear the 
request for a stay of execution.19 The court granted the inmates a twelfth-
hour stay until the appeal of the constitutionality of the statute could be 
heard.20 Two days later, the supreme court issued a ruling on the merits and 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. ¶ 2, 329 P.3d at 756-57. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. n.6, 329 P.3d at 756. 
 14. Id. ¶ 2, 329 P.3d at 756-57. 
 15. Id. ¶ 2, 329, P.3d at 757. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. ¶ 4, 329 P.3d at 758. 
 18. Lockett v. Evans (Lockett 3), 2014 OK 33, ¶ 6, 356 P.3d 58, 59-60 (per curium) 
(mem. opin.). 
 19. Id. ¶ 13, 356 P.3d at 61. 
 20. Id. ¶ 15, 356 P.3d at 61. 
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held that the inmates’ constitutional rights had not been violated, thus 
dissolving the stay on the executions it had previously administered.21  
Regardless of whether this game of jurisdictional hot-potato reached the 
correct end, there are significant issues with the means. The supreme court 
recognized that it must either act without jurisdiction or deny Lockett and 
Warner access to the courts for their claims; claims which the appellants’ 
lives truly depended on.22 And while the supreme court by all accounts 
chose the lesser of two evils by granting the stay of execution, in a properly 
functioning judicial structure such a prisoner’s dilemma should never 
enchain the courts. 
Further, while this scenario has a particular flair for the dramatic, it is far 
from the only situation where such a dilemma matters. While some assert 
that “mercifully few”23 of these jurisdictional conflicts arise, the fact is, as 
shown above, that any time the supreme court and the court of criminal 
appeals disagree about which court has jurisdiction, negative consequences 
may follow. Moreover, regardless of the number of times these conflicts 
occur, the ripples in their wake are large enough that they need to be 
eliminated entirely. Most importantly, while perhaps the fact that there have 
not been more conflicts is a testament to “the constant willingness of the 
members of each Court to observe and comply with their jurisdictional 
restrictions,”24 foundational principles of democracy and fairness contend 
that citizens should not have to rely on the goodwill of those with power to 
make the right decisions, but rather demand that systematic checks are in 
place.25  
This Comment thus contends that the system of appellate jurisdiction in 
Oklahoma needs to be changed. Part II of the Comment gives an 
explanation of the current state of appellate jurisdiction in Oklahoma. Part 
III examines in more detail the issues with the current system and where 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Lockett 4, 2014 OK 34, ¶ 20, 330 P.3d 488, 492 (per curium). And yet, even at this 
point, the drama continues. See Bailey Elise McBride & Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Inmate 
Dies After Execution Is Botched, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2014, 1:04 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20140430/us--oklahoma-double-execution/?utm_ 
hp_ref=travel&ir=travel. 
 22. See Lockett 3, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d at 61. 
 23. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 5, 
184 P.3d 546, 548. 
 24. Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 1978 OK 130, ¶ 1, 595 P.2d 416, 418. 
 25. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (arguing that it is not 
enough that the Constitution merely separate the three branches of government on paper, to 
be upheld by goodwill and fair play. Instead, actual powers must be given to each branch to 
prevent the erosion of its power by another). 
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they originate. Part IV argues why the problems found within the current 
state of appellate jurisdiction warrant concern. Finally, Part V offers an 
examination of potential solutions to the problem, and Part VI concludes. 
II. Current System of Appellate Jurisdiction 
Although additional intricacies have been added through statutes and 
case law, the base of the Oklahoma system of appellate jurisdiction lies in 
the Oklahoma State Constitution. While judges were originally chosen 
through partisan elections, several bribery scandals in the 1960s led to the 
amendment of article VII of the Oklahoma Constitution, the cornerstone of 
judicial power in the state, in 1967.26 Of particular importance here, section 
1 of article VII roots traditional civil and criminal judicial power in the 
supreme court and the court of criminal appeals.27 Section 1 states that the 
court of criminal appeals, while still continuing in effect, remains “subject 
to the power of the legislature to change or abolish said Courts.”28 
Presumably, this is because the court of criminal appeals was created by 
statute in 1907.29 Therefore, while article VII acknowledges the validity of 
the court of criminal appeals, it does not bestow upon the court any more 
power than it was originally conferred; the court’s authority still comes 
from the legislature, not the constitution. And what the legislature giveth, 
the legislature can taketh away. 
Article VII defines the jurisdictional scope of the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma.30 Namely, that the supreme court’s appellate jurisdiction 
extends “to all cases at law and in equity.”31 There is one critical exception 
though: the court of criminal appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Lesli E. McCollum, The Oklahoma Judiciary, in THE ALMANAC OF OKLAHOMA 
POLITICS 1998, at 15, 22-23 (Gary W. Copeland et al. eds., 1998), http://ojs.library.okstate. 
edu/osu/index.php/OKPolitics/article/view/1047/944.  
 27. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 28. Id.  
 29. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011); History of the Court, OKLA. COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS, http://www.okcca.net/History.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2017). This is made clearer 
by the fact that the state’s original constitution does not list the court of criminal appeals as a 
body in which the judicial power is vested. Oklahoma Constitution, OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.okhistory.org/research/okconstitution#page/27/mode/1up (last visited Mar. 10, 
2017). Instead, the original article VII, section 2 gives the power to hear criminal appeals to 
the supreme court until such time as a court of criminal appeals “shall be established by 
law.” Id. 
 30. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 31. Id.  
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criminal cases.32 This puts Oklahoma in the rather unusual position of 
having two courts of last resort.33 Yet, as before, this grant of power to the 
court of criminal appeals is not without loopholes: the constitution again 
goes on to say that this exclusive jurisdiction given to the court of criminal 
appeals only survives “until otherwise provided by statute.”34 While the text 
specifically notes that both the supreme court and the court of criminal 
appeals have the power to issue remedial writs (such as writs of habeas 
corpus, mandamus and certiorari for matters within their respective 
jurisdiction), the text also makes clear that the supreme court retains 
“general superintending control” over all inferior courts “created by law.”35  
Neither this section nor any other of Oklahoma’s constitution defines the 
difference between civil and criminal matters. Yet the constitution does 
recognize that in some cases the line between the two may not be bright. 
Therefore, section 4 provides a method of resolution in the event that 
conflicts arise between the two courts.36 In such a case, the supreme court 
shall decide where the matter should reside and that decision will be final.37 
This power to determine jurisdiction is extensive, extending even beyond 
conflicts in which the supreme court is involved.38 This means that even 
when the court of criminal appeals and another inferior court disagree over 
jurisdiction, the supreme court can interject on its own accord and resolve 
the issue.39 One important, established limitation of this power is that when 
civil claims depend on the outcome of a criminal claim wrapped up in the 
same appeal, the civil claims cannot be litigated until the criminal matter is 
disposed of.40  
In summation, the court of criminal appeals has jurisdiction over 
everything that is criminal. Additionally, the supreme court has jurisdiction 
over everything that is not criminal (thus, everything that is civil). Finally, 
the supreme court resolves conflicts between the two. This means that the 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. 
 33. See McCollum, supra note 26, at 17. 
 34. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 35. Id. And as the court of criminal appeals is created by law, it would seem to be 
included in this category. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Jackson v. Freeman, 1995 OK 100, ¶ 9, 905 P.2d 217, 220 (holding the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma has the ability to determine jurisdictional complaints against 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals).  
 39. See id. 
 40. Smith v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2001 OK 95, ¶¶ 8-10, 37 P.3d 872, 873-74. 
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supreme court essentially defines what is civil and what is criminal.41 
Specifically, the supreme court has held that the determination of such 
jurisdictional issues “is not a legislative matter, but a constitutional issue to 
be determined by this Court.”42  
Therefore, the supreme court, through its decisions, plays a large part in 
determining the appellate structure in Oklahoma. The supreme court has 
stated in multiple opinions that it makes such determinations on a “case-by-
case basis.”43 Case-by-case determinations typically rely on ad hoc 
reasoning, meaning the decision is based purely on the individual facts of 
that case "without consideration of wider application," as opposed to 
applying a single hard-and-fast rule to all similar cases.44 An examination 
of several decisions where the supreme court resolved jurisdictional 
conflicts based on the distinction between civil and criminal cases reveals 
that this court's jurisprudence does in fact lack a hard-and-fast rule. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court began walking the civil/criminal tightrope 
as early as 1927 in Dancy v. Owens.45 At issue was whether the supreme 
court or the court of criminal appeals had jurisdiction over writs of habeas 
corpus.46 There, the court promulgated a practical yet broad definition of 
criminal cases, namely those which are “prosecuted in the name of the state 
either by indictment or by information filed in a trial court.”47 The court 
stated that the “law of this state” clearly provides this definition, yet it 
failed to cite any authority as to where that assertion originates.48 The court 
also distinguished between civil and criminal by stating that “[p]roceedings 
to enforce civil rights are civil proceedings and proceedings for the 
punishment of crimes are criminal proceedings.”49 Therefore, a writ of 
habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and within the jurisdiction of the 
supreme court, because even though it  arose out of a criminal case, it is “a 
new suit brought by [the petitioner] to enforce a civil right . . . as against 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 42. In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 8, 145 P.3d 1040, 1044. 
 43. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7, 
184 P.3d 546, 549. 
 44. Ad hoc, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/ad%20hoc (last visited Sept. 17, 2016). 
 45. 1927 OK 203, 258 P. 879. Note that Dancy was decided before the amendments to 
the Oklahoma Constitution in 1967, so the relevant portion is limited to their discussion of 
what is criminal and civil, not their opening analysis of article 7, sections 1 and 2. 
 46. Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 258 P. at 884. 
 47. Id. ¶ 15, 258 P. at 882. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. ¶ 24, 258 P. at 885 (quoting Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 560 (1883). 
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those who are holding him . . . under the criminal process.”50 Therefore, at 
least potentially under this reasoning, if a criminal defendant challenges the 
constitutionality of the judicial process in some way, he is seeking to 
enforce his civil rights. Thus, the appeal would be a civil matter under the 
jurisdiction of the supreme court. Employed broadly, such a definition 
could potentially put many more cases before the supreme court than the 
court of criminal appeals. 
The court further parsed the issue out by making an exception to its 
previously stated rule, noting that contempt hearings, even though 
involving punishment, are not criminal in nature.51 Indeed, “[c]ourts which 
have no criminal jurisdiction can punish for so-called criminal contempt, 
because the power to do so is inherent, and necessary to the efficiency and 
very existence of the court.”52 Therefore, jurisdiction simply lies in the 
court in which the actions leading to the contempt sanction occurred.53 
In 1990, almost sixty-five years later, in State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, 
the supreme court was confronted with the question of whether 
amendments to an earned credits statute for inmates violated ex post facto 
requirements if the amendments enhanced the sentence of a current 
prisoner.54 The court of criminal appeals argued that it did not have 
jurisdiction because the process of applying earned credits to a sentence is 
an administrative function that is separate from the underlying criminal 
case.55 Another argument that potentially could have been raised is that this 
case demands resolution of a civil right, the right to be free from ex post 
facto punishments, which merely arose from a criminal proceeding. 
Therefore, the case would fit nicely within the framework of Dancy, and 
thus be under the jurisdiction of the supreme court. Instead, the court stated 
that “[c]learly questions pertaining to the length of sentences and credit 
time for reduction of those sentences belong in the Court of Criminal 
Appeals.”56 And although the court briefly cites to Dancy in making an 
ancillary point, it makes no effort to distinguish or explain the opposite 
outcomes, so it is unclear whether this outcome is better characterized as an 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. (quoting Tom Tong, 108 U.S. at 560). 
 51. Id. ¶ 30, 258 P. at 885. 
 52. Id. ¶ 31, 258 P. at 885 (quoting Smith v. State ex rel. Gallaher, 1916 OK CR 80, 159 
P. 941, 943). 
 53. Id. 
 54. 1990 OK 3, ¶ 1, 786 P.2d 82, 83. 
 55. Id. ¶ 10, 786 P.2d at 84-85. 
 56. Id. ¶ 15, 786 P.2d at 86. 
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exception for issues of sentencing or an overhaul of the Dancy 
framework.57 
The court returned to its Mahler rationale again eleven years later in 
Smith v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections.58 There, a former inmate 
disputed fees that she paid over her two-year period of supervised 
probations.59 The court found the fees were “a condition of her probation 
and thus, her sentence.”60 Therefore, since the length or amount of the 
petitioner’s punishment was essential to the issue, it is “clearly with in [sic] 
the Court of Criminal Appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction.”61 
The next context in which the dispute arose before the supreme court 
was whether an individual should be tried as a juvenile or an adult in In re 
M.B.62 Yet there, the court did not examine the substance of the claim as it 
did in Dancy by looking at whether the appeal asserted a civil right or not. 
Instead, the court looked to the origins of the procedural scenario that led to 
the appeal, asserting that the appeal “arose out of a criminal case” and 
therefore belonged in the court of criminal appeals.63 This new 
understanding of how to determine jurisdiction puts far more weight on the 
side of the court of criminal appeals than the court’s previous methods; this 
template gives the court of criminal appeals jurisdiction over any appeal 
that originated with the prosecution of an individual under the criminal 
code, even if that individual now asserts a civil right. Again, the court made 
this shift without attempting to reconcile Dancy.64 
The supreme court moved back toward the Dancy rationale, however, in 
Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, which 
analyzed the jurisdiction of an appeal regarding a grand jury’s power to 
issue a subpoena.65 Following the framework of In re M.B., it would seem 
that any matter involving a grand jury arises out of a criminal case and thus 
belongs in the court of criminal appeals. Yet, the court here returned to 
classifying the type of substantive appeal actually before it, as in Dancy.66 
Specifically, the court noted that if an appeal involving a grand jury raises 
issues of criminal procedure, then the appeal would fall within the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. ¶ 12, 786 P.2d at 85. 
 58. 2001 OK 95, 37 P.3d 872.  
 59. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 37 P.3d at 873. 
 60. Id. ¶ 8, 37 P.3d at 873-74.  
 61. Id. ¶ 10, 37 P.3d at 874. 
 62. 2006 OK 63, ¶¶ 1-2, 145 P.3d 1040, 1041-42. 
 63. Id. ¶ 14, 145 P.3d at 1047. 
 64. See M.B., 2006 OK 63, 145 P.3d 1040. 
 65. 2008 OK 36, ¶ 1, 184 P.3d 546, 547-48. 
 66. Id. ¶¶ 9-11, 184 P.3d at 549. 
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jurisdiction of the court of criminal appeals.67 Whereas the question in 
Dixon only required a “generalized analysis of constitutional and statutory 
norms,” thus the case was properly situated before the supreme court.68  
Similarly, in Movants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in 
Multicounty Grand Jury v. Powers, the court assumed jurisdiction over a 
dispute involving a grand jury.69 The court noted, however, as in Dixon, 
that jurisdiction regarding a grand jury could potentially go either way, to 
the supreme court or the court of criminal appeals, depending on the 
specific issue involved.70 There, the deciding factor that gave the supreme 
court jurisdiction was not that the case was civil or criminal in nature, but 
rather that it was “a matter of broad public concern.”71 
The supreme court further complicated the plot in Leftwich v. Court of 
Criminal Appeals.72 Leftwich sought to limit the court of criminal appeals’ 
ability to interpret the Oklahoma Constitution, presumably because she was 
aware of the holding in In re M.B. as mentioned above.73 The supreme 
court, however, declined to assume jurisdiction and refused to address the 
jurisdictional issue.74 It did so, however, not because the appeals were in 
any way criminal in nature, but because the parties agreed that the issues 
were not adequately raised before the court of criminal appeals, and that 
their interpretation of the Oklahoma Constitution was erroneous.75 This 
seems especially strange given the protective nature the supreme court has 
previously demonstrated over its role as the only body able to determine 
jurisdiction under the Oklahoma Constitution.76 Because of this, several 
judges dissented from the majority. The reasoning of each differed, but all 
of the three dissenters agreed that the court should have at least asserted its 
authority to decide the jurisdictional issue.77  
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. ¶ 10, 184 P.3d at 549. 
 68. Id. ¶ 11, 184 P.3d at 549. 
 69. 1992 OK 142, ¶ 2, 839 P.2d 655, 656. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d 750. 
 73. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 262 P.3d at 750; see also In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 8, 145 P.3d 1040, 
1044-45. 
 74. Leftwich, ¶¶ 3-4, 262 P.3d at 750-51. 
 75. Id. ¶ 2, 262 P.3d at 750. 
 76. Compare this attitude to State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, 1990 OK 3, ¶ 2, 786 P.2d 82, 
83, in which the supreme court refused to dismiss a jurisdictional conflict as moot just 
because the court of criminal appeals had denied jurisdiction over the matter.  
 77. Leftwich, 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d 750 (Winchester, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, positing that the court should have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to 
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But, while the court’s decision in Leftwich leaves much to be desired,78 
their end result is not without precedent.79 In Hinkle v. Kenny, the supreme 
court agreed to leave statutory construction, and even constitutional 
analysis, in the hands of the court of criminal appeals.80 It did so because 
the legislature had created the court of criminal appeals, pursuant to article 
VII, section 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution.81 The supreme court chose to 
do so, not because it was powerless to interpret such statutes itself-even 
criminal ones—but because it is their “policy, deliberately adopted, of 
avoiding a conflict of opinions and decisions between the two courts.”82 In 
other words, the supreme court could hear such issues, but would rather not. 
Again, this seems to be analysis after the heart of In re M.B., where the 
supreme court is not worried that the court of criminal appeals is hearing 
civil issues, as long as they arose from a criminal case.83 
Finally, and most recently, in 2015 the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
decided Dutton v. City of Midwest City, an appeal of the legal correctness of 
the petitioner’s convictions and sentence for assault, public intoxication, 
and domestic assault and battery.84 There, the supreme court gave a much 
more detailed analysis of why it refused to adopt jurisdiction, listing four 
ways in which the petitioner failed to show that the court should have 
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s request to have his previous convictions 
invalidated.85 First, the petitioner failed to show why the substantive claim 
was a civil cause of action as opposed to criminal, meaning a cause of 
action involving “personal criminal liability, defenses thereto, and the 
imposition and execution of a criminal sentence.”86 Second, the petitioner 
failed to show the claim was based on institutional deficiencies separate 
from the underlying criminal cause of action.87 Third, the petitioner did not 
                                                                                                                 
review the court of criminal appeals in an undisputed criminal matter) (Watt, J., dissenting, 
arguing that the supreme court should assert original jurisdiction and prevent the state from 
pursuing charges under the current statute) (Reif, J., dissenting, stating that the court should 
assume original jurisdiction because the case presents a matter of significant public interest). 
 78. The main reason why the majority’s stance is so difficult to decipher is that their 
opinion spans a mere four paragraphs. See id. 
 79. Albeit, a cite to which is not given within their four paragraphs. 
 80. 1936 OK 582, ¶ 10, 62 P.2d 621, 622. 
 81. Id. ¶ 9, 362 P.2d at 622. 
 82. Id. ¶ 12, 62 P.2d at 623. 
 83. See In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶¶ 13-14, 145 P.3d 1040, 1047. 
 84. 2015 OK 51, ¶¶ 2-3, 353 P.3d 532, 536. 
 85. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 540-41.  
 86. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 540. 
 87. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 540-41. 
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claim that the court of criminal appeals had acted in excess of its 
authority.88 Finally, the petitioner did not show that there was concurrent 
civil jurisdiction for any reason in the supreme court in addition to a 
criminal proceeding in another court.89 Again, this analysis is essentially 
based upon whether the underlying substantive issue is a civil or criminal 
one. 
The supreme court further explained its reasoning on the difference 
between civil and criminal matters. Specifically, the court noted that 
criminal claims include those that are “previously brought by a criminal 
defendant when using the form of a common-law writ to challenge his or 
her criminal judgment and sentence.”90 Therefore, unlike the supreme court 
had previously held, merely seeking a writ that can be issued by the 
supreme court “does not transform a criminal matter into a civil matter.”91 
Instead, the court must look to the petitioner’s substantive claims to 
determine whether they are criminal or civil.92 
In short, four things about the appellate jurisdiction in Oklahoma are 
clear: (1) the supreme court has jurisdiction over civil matters;93 (2) the 
court of criminal appeals has jurisdiction over criminal matters;94 (3) the 
supreme court has the final authority to determine which court has 
jurisdiction;95 and (4) these decisions are made on an ad hoc, case-by-case 
basis.96 Such determinations eschew neat and clean categorization by their 
nature, but by examining the above opinions, rough categories begin to 
appear.  
As noted throughout the above paragraphs, there are essentially two 
different categories of analysis that the supreme court has used to make its 
decisions in jurisdictional matters. The first is that found in Dancy, the 
“type of appeal” category, which analyzes which court should have 
jurisdiction with respect to the type of substantive law that the appeal is 
based on.97 The second is derived from In re M.B., the “origin” category, 
which analyzes which court the underlying appeal arose out of, regardless 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 541. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. ¶ 21, 353 P.3d at 541 (emphasis omitted). 
 91. Id. ¶ 21, 353 P.3d at 542. 
 92. Id. 
 93. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7, 
184 P.3d 546, 548. 
 97. See Dancy v. Owens, 1927 OK 203, ¶ 26, 258 P. 879, 884. 
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of the type of substantive law involved.98 Of those analyzed in this 
Comment, the court is relatively split in its use of the two categories, 
employing the former in four cases99 and the latter in three,100 while two 
cases use a concoction that could well be placed in either category.101 
Further, there is no clear shift or pattern in the court’s preference for a 
particular category over time.102 Even a cursory glance through this case 
law shows that the doctrine is confusing, convoluted, and conflicting. But 
this revelation is not new to the supreme court. In fact, in Dixon, the court 
concedes outright that when these cases are examined in light of each other 
“[t]he results can be confusing.”103 Yet the supreme court does not see this 
as a negative. Rather, it asserts that its case-by-case method of 
determination is superior because “a hard-and-fast rule would not serve the 
ends of justice.”104 In looking at the broader picture, however, this assertion 
seems difficult to support. 
III. The Problem 
The current system of appellate jurisdiction in Oklahoma, as explained in 
the previous section, differs from the typical way other states or the federal 
government approach the same issue.105 While there is nothing inherently 
wrong with this, and in fact it is most likely a positive trait,106 Lockett 
reveals that there are some problems with the system in practice. This part 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 13, 145 P.3d 1040, 1047. 
 99. See Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 21, 353 P.3d 532, 541-42; 
Dixon, ¶¶ 10-11, 184 P.3d at 549-50; Movants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in 
Multicounty Grand Jury v. Powers, 1992 OK 142, ¶ 2, 839 P.2d 655, 656; Dancy, ¶ 13, 258 
P. at 882. 
 100. See Leftwich v. City of Midwest City, 2011 OK 80, ¶¶ 3-4, 262 P.3d 750, 750; 
M.B., ¶ 14, 145 P.3d at 1047; Hinkle v. Kenny, 1936 OK 582, ¶ 12, 62 P.2d 621, 622-23.  
 101. See Smith v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 2001 OK 95, ¶ 10, 37 P.3d 872, 874; State ex rel. 
Henry v. Mahler, 1990 OK 3, ¶ 12, 786 P.2d 82, 85. 
 102. In fact, when the seven clearer cut cases are put together chronologically, they 
alternate perfectly: Dancy, 1927 OK 203, 258 P. 879 (Type); Hinkle, 1936 OK 532, 62 P.2d 
621 (Origin); Powers, 1992 OK 142, 839 P.2d 655 (Type); In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, 145 P3d 
1040 (Origin); Dixon, 2008 OK 36, 184 P.3d 546 (Type); Leftwich, 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d 
750 (Origin); Dutton, 2014 OK 51, 353 P.3d 532 (Type). 
 103. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, n.1, 184 P.3d at 548. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See McCollum, supra note 26, at 15-17. 
 106. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that denial of the right of the states to experiment in economic and 
social issues might be costly; interestingly enough, the case also involved an Oklahoma 
law). 
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will first examine other potential situations where problems similar to 
Lockett could arise, producing suboptimal scenarios. Second, it will show 
why these scenarios should be considered suboptimal, although that 
assertion is further developed in Part IV. Finally, it will begin to explore 
precisely where in the current system these problems originate from.  
A. Scenarios  
In an instance of jurisdictional conflict between the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, there are many 
different possible outcomes. The one constant, however, is that the supreme 
court will make the decision.107 In such a scenario, the supreme court has 
two initial options: (1) keep the case or (2) transfer it to the court of 
criminal appeals. So, logically, if the supreme court follows the first option 
and decides to keep the case, there are two possible outcomes or scenarios. 
Scenario One 
The conflict involves a case “at law [or] in equity.”108 In this case, the 
supreme court should indeed have jurisdiction, making this an optimal 
outcome. 
Scenario Two 
The conflict involves a “criminal case[].”109 This scenario is a complex 
one, as the supreme court has, on one hand, violated a provision of the 
Oklahoma Constitution as shown above by taking a criminal case.110 But on 
the other hand, the supreme court is authorized to “determine which court 
has jurisdiction and such determination shall be final.”111 One would hope 
that the supreme court would refrain from making such a decision in an 
obvious case. But in a close call with honest intentions, the supreme court 
would still infringe upon the jurisdiction of the court of criminal appeals 
without recourse. For reasons developed further below, this is a suboptimal 
outcome. 
The second initial option before the supreme court is to transfer the 
matter to the court of criminal appeals. In this instance there are five new 
potential scenarios or outcomes. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 107. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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Scenario Three 
The court of criminal appeals accepts the case. If the case involves a 
criminal matter, then the court of criminal appeals rightly has 
jurisdiction.112 This is merely the inverse of Scenario One, and is thus also 
an optimal outcome. 
Scenario Four 
The court of criminal appeals again accepts the case. If the case in fact 
does not involve a criminal matter, however, then the supreme court should 
have jurisdiction.113 This is the inverse of Scenario Two, and thus by the 
same rationale is a suboptimal outcome. 
Scenario Five 
The court of criminal appeals refuses to accept the case, and then the 
supreme court concedes to hear it. Albeit lacking several intermediary 
steps, this is essentially the Lockett scenario. As the supreme court would 
now be hearing a case that it previously determined it did not have 
jurisdiction over, this is a suboptimal outcome. 
Scenario Six 
The court of criminal appeals refuses to accept the case, the supreme 
court refuses to take the case back, and then the court of criminal appeals 
concedes to hear it. This is Scenario Five in the inverse, with the court of 
criminal appeals now hearing a case that it previously determined it did not 
have jurisdiction over, rather than the supreme court. There is an argument 
that this outcome is optimal because the supreme court has the ability to 
make final determinations, and so the court of criminal appeals’ 
determination should not matter.114 But since the court of criminal appeals 
is nevertheless hearing a case it believes it has no jurisdiction over and has 
issued some sort of opinion or order to that effect, this is still a suboptimal 
outcome. 
Scenario Seven 
The court of criminal appeals refuses to accept the case, and the supreme 
court refuses to take the case back. If neither court gives in, there will 
eventually be a point of no return, and either the rights of the parties in the 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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case at issue will become moot, or they will give up. This essentially leads 
to a denial of the rights of the parties in a decision that is not based on the 
merits of the case. Imagine if in Lockett, for example, the supreme court in 
its memorandum opinion on April 21, 2014, once again asserted that the 
case should be before the court of criminal appeals instead of taking up the 
appeal. In that case, the inmates would have been executed on the mornings 
of April 22 and 29, without their appeal being heard.115 Again, this is a 
suboptimal outcome. 
Therefore, in summary, whenever a jurisdictional conflict arises between 
the supreme court and the court of criminal appeals, there are seven 
possible outcomes. Of these seven, only two are optimal (Scenarios One 
and Three). The remaining five are all suboptimal (Scenarios Two, Four, 
Five, Six, and Seven). Of the suboptimal scenarios, there are three different 
categories of reasons why the individual scenario is less than desirable. The 
first is that the scenario involves one of the courts infringing upon the 
express jurisdiction of the other as delineated in the constitution (Scenarios 
Two and Four).116 The second is where the court that ultimately decides the 
case has previously stated in an opinion, order, or other pronouncement that 
it had no jurisdiction over the matter (Scenarios Five and Six). The third 
and final category is where each court declines to take the case, resulting in 
a de facto denial of the appeal (Scenario Seven). 
B. Why Suboptimal 
All three of these categories raise concerns for the structure of the 
judicial branch as a whole. While there is some overlap, however, the 
concerns vary in both type and degree among the different categories. 
Therefore, each category is discussed individually in more detail below.  
1. Jurisdictional Infringement (Scenarios Two and Four)  
Typically, state courts are courts of general jurisdiction.117 This means 
that the court can hear any case brought before it “unless a showing is made 
to the contrary.”118 In Oklahoma, however, both the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals are courts of limited 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Lockett 3, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 6, 356 P.3d 58, 59-60 (per curium) (mem. opin.). 
 116. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 117. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
 118. Id. 
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jurisdiction, as stipulated by the Oklahoma Constitution.119 This makes 
these Oklahoma courts, for purposes of this discussion, more similar to 
federal courts than other state courts, as federal courts are also of limited 
jurisdiction.120  
The importance of a court having limited jurisdiction is that there are 
basic structural restrictions in place, the breaking of which is “no mere 
technical violation” but rather “an unconstitutional usurpation” of power 
not granted to the court.121 This means that when the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court hears a criminal case, it is not merely failing being a good chum to its 
sister court. Instead, whether willingly or not, it is usurping its express, 
delineated jurisdiction and violating the foremost authority of the State of 
Oklahoma.122 In turn, when this decision is made outside of the authority 
granted to the court by elected representatives in the legislature, democratic 
power is taken from the hands of Oklahoma citizens.123  
Of course, there is a further complication here as the Oklahoma 
Constitution grants the supreme court the power to have the final say in 
whether a matter is civil or criminal.124 Therefore, the question is fairly 
raised whether it is possible for the Oklahoma Supreme Court to exercise 
power outside of its jurisdiction when it decides the line at which its 
jurisdiction stops in actuality or only in theory. Such an usurpation of 
power, however, is very much an actual threat.  
It is true that the definitional boundary between what is criminal and 
what is civil is often blurry; indeed, this is why the authors of Oklahoma’s 
constitution included a provision for deciding precisely such jurisdictional 
disputes.125 So in a close call, the supreme court trumps. Nevertheless, 
assuredly occasions arise where it would simply be wrong for the supreme 
court to assert jurisdiction. Examples abound. Any appeals regarding issues 
of evidence, sentencing, or substantive criminal law surely belong in this 
                                                                                                                 
 119. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (stating that the Oklahoma Supreme Court does not have 
jurisdiction over criminal cases); 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011) (granting the court of criminal 
appeals jurisdiction over criminal matters). 
 120. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 3522 (stating that federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction, and thus can only hear cases that are within the grant of the judicial 
power from the Constitution, and have been supplied by Congress). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Namely of course, OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 123. Dustin E. Buehler, Solving Jurisdiction’s Social Cost, 89 WASH. L. REV. 653, 660 
(2014). 
 124. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 125. See id. (“[I]n the event there is any conflict as to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
shall determine which court has jurisdiction and such determination shall be final.”). 
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category. Even if the supreme court asserted jurisdiction over such cases—
leaving the court of criminal appeals with no recourse—that would surely 
be unconstitutional. Despite the fact that the supreme court is the final 
arbiter, it simply does not have jurisdiction over criminal matters.126 
And indeed, this should be a constitutional violation. This is made clear 
by the fact that the Oklahoma Constitution, while granting the supreme 
court a wide array of authority, does not go so far as giving it general 
jurisdiction, or giving it authority to determine its own limits to 
jurisdiction.127 Therefore, the supreme court has authority to determine its 
own jurisdiction within boundaries provided by the Oklahoma Constitution. 
Thus, it can violate this mandate, and can do so obviously at the extremes. 
The problem is, in a close-call case, the court can violate the constitution 
silently, by hearing a case that should be criminal. This can happen without 
anyone (the court of criminal appeals, the litigants, or even the supreme 
court itself) being aware it has done so. 
2. Previous Opinion or Order Denying Jurisdiction (Scenarios Five and 
Six) 
All of the issues above are implicated in this particular situation as well, 
with one exception: the constitutional violation that occurs when a court 
hears a case it has jurisdiction over is no longer silent. Above, where the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court has never spoken to whether a particular issue 
falls within its jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of the court of criminal 
appeals, the validity of its decision necessarily involves line-drawing of a 
blurry and unclear definition.  
In this situation however, there has been an additional step. Because the 
supreme court (or court of criminal appeals) has already spoken to the 
jurisdictional issue, any lack of clarity is removed. The court has no 
jurisdiction, a fact supported by the constitution and the jurisprudence of 
the supreme court.128 Therefore, it is clear that they have no jurisdiction. 
Choosing to exercise it is therefore problematic for all the same reasons 
mentioned in the preceding section. 
3. De facto Denial of the Appeal (Scenario Seven) 
Here, neither court would choose to act, eventually leading to the case 
being disposed of. This is problematic because the case would not be 
determined on its merits. And while it is generally thought to be preferable 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. §§ 1, 4. 
 128. Id. § 4. 
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to decide a case on its merits rather than procedural deficiencies,129 this is 
definitely true here as the procedural deficiency is beyond the individual 
parties’ control. Rather, the result would be from a lack of any court 
wanting to assume jurisdiction over the matter.  
In Lockett, when faced with this decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
found that this alternative would violate article II, section 6 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution.130 This section provides that the courts will be 
open to every person and assures them a “certain remedy afforded for every 
wrong.”131 The court seems correct in concluding that this section implies 
that all citizens have a right of access to the courts, meaning that they must 
be given an opportunity to be heard.132 This conclusion led the Lockett 
court to hear the case rather than violate this constitutional right.133 And 
while the Lockett court perhaps was correct in choosing the lesser of two 
evils,134 the fact of the matter is that both options were less than ideal, with 
each potentially resulting in a constitutional violation.135 This is a situation 
which should never occur in a properly functioning system. 
C. Origin of Problems 
If the system indeed is problematic, then it needs to be corrected. But, 
merely stating that a car is broken is not enough for a mechanic to fix it. 
The mechanic first needs to know whether the problem is due to the engine 
or the transmission before he or she can make the car run properly again. 
Similarly, it must be identified what exactly it is within Oklahoma’s 
appellate system that makes these problems occur; a solution cannot be 
designed until it is clear what must be addressed. As above, the problems 
can be organized according to the different scenarios. 
First, Scenarios Five, Six, and Seven occur when the supreme court and 
the court of criminal appeals disagree about which court has jurisdiction. 
Therefore, these problems emanate from whatever in the system allows the 
two courts to disagree. Namely, this stems from the fact that the supreme 
court has the ability to arbitrate jurisdiction between the two.136 This leaves 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Edward F. Sherman, Dean Pound’s Dissatisfaction with the “Sporting Theory of 
Justice”: Where Are We a Hundred Years Later?, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 983, 997 (2007). 
 130. See Lockett 3, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curium) (mem. opin.). 
 131. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
 132. See Lockett 3, ¶ 13, 256 P. 3d 58, 61. 
 133. Id. ¶ 14, 356 P.3d at 61. 
 134. The relatively indirect constitutional violation of exerting authority not granted to it 
by the constitution or the legislature against the direct denial of rights to citizens. 
 135. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
 136. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
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the court of criminal appeals in an awkward, hybrid sort of position 
between being a court of last resort for all criminal matters and still being 
clearly inferior to the supreme court.  
Second, Scenarios Two and Four occur when either court takes 
jurisdiction where it should not, which is problematic for reasons explained 
above. This alone, however, is hard to stop and is a problem faced by all 
courts on every level, as it would be impossible to prevent this while also 
allowing courts to determine their own jurisdiction. Therefore, there will 
likely always be at least some inherent risk. Typically, this is handled by 
checks on judicial power from other branches—namely, that the judiciary 
has neither the sword nor the purse, so if they make a decision beyond the 
bounds of their authority, the executive branch and the legislature may 
choose not to enforce or give weight to the decision.137 In Oklahoma, 
however, there is the additional problematic possibility of “silent 
violations” by the supreme court, as discussed above, when they make 
decisions. 
Both of these situations, therefore, seem to stem from the supreme court 
being the final arbiter of jurisdiction. This is further compounded by the 
confusion resulting from the supreme court’s jurisprudence, despite its 
assertions to the contrary.138 Surely there needs to be some flexibility, as the 
supreme court acknowledges. Yet, here it comes at the cost of clarity. If the 
supreme court consistently used a clearer standard to make jurisdictional 
decisions, then the court of criminal appeals could analyze on its own 
before rejecting or accepting jurisdiction, raising the odds greatly that the 
two courts will agree instead of disagree. That would also keep the supreme 
court honest: if it made a decision out of line with that standard, the court of 
criminal appeals, the executive branch, and the legislature would have 
grounds to ignore the opinion.  
IV. Why It Matters 
These problems with the current system of appellate jurisdiction are not 
merely theoretical or abstract; they have lasting impacts upon how justice is 
dispensed in Oklahoma. In particular, there are three broader areas affected 
by these problems: efficiency, control of the case by litigants, and the Rule 
of Law.  
                                                                                                                 
 137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009). 
 138. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7, 
n.1, 184 P.3d 546, 548-49. 
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A. Efficiency 
In making jurisdictional decisions, courts commonly adopt one of two 
contrasting perspectives. First, courts may focus on the structural concerns 
that arise when a court exercises jurisdiction where it should not. These 
courts are acutely aware of the importance of respecting their constitutional 
or statutory boundaries, finding that “‘no amount of “prudential reasons” or 
perceived increases in efficiency’ can justify adjudication when jurisdiction 
does not exist.”139 By contrast, under the second perspective, courts may 
consider the massive amount of waste that occurs when cases are dismissed 
for jurisdictional purposes, especially late in the process.140 Courts that 
adopt this perspective might be more willing to blur the lines and exercise 
jurisdiction in questionable situations in order to ensure that the litigants 
receive an opportunity to be heard on the merits of their case.  
Yet neither structural concerns nor efficiency can be viewed in isolation, 
as both are implicated by nonwaivable jurisdictional rules; instead there 
must be a balance between the two.141 Therefore, focusing on the structural 
component to the exclusion of efficiency concerns still leads to suboptimal 
results.142 This applies to the current structure of the appellate jurisdiction 
in Oklahoma. 
The problem is clear when Scenario Seven is examined, the situation 
where neither court wants to take jurisdiction, constituting a de facto denial 
of the case. Placing aside the concerns over lack of court access and looking 
only at the structural issue of whether either the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
or Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has exercised power which it does 
not have, this scenario comes out well. Indeed, both courts have played 
their hands conservatively, but the bottom line is that the supreme court has 
obviously not heard a criminal case and the court of criminal appeals has 
clearly not heard a civil case. Thus, each has acted within its constitutional 
bounds.143  
Yet this is likely small consolation to the parties, as no amount of 
technical legal propriety can bring back "their sunk litigation costs.”144 By 
this point, the parties have already either hired new lawyers or retained their 
old, and put forth, at a minimum, the costs of filing an appeal and quite 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Buehler, supra note 123, at 660 (quoting Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 
1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 140. Id. at 661. 
 141. Id. at 664. 
 142. See id. at 660-64. 
 143. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 144. Buehler, supra note 123, at 664. 
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likely a good deal more than that.145 If we accept the definition of 
inefficient as “not capable of producing desired results without wasting 
materials, time, or energy,”146 then this seems to fit the bill. Materials, time, 
and energy were all spent, and the desired result of having the appeal heard 
on the merits has not been produced. 
Moreover, this means that even if the Oklahoma Supreme Court makes a 
choice that stays within its constitutional bounds, allows the court of 
criminal appeals to do the same, and the litigants are heard on the merits of 
their case (as is the case in Scenarios One and Three), these structurally 
optimal results can still quickly be turned suboptimal. This is exemplified 
by the long, complex procedural history in Lockett.147 Assuming that the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court is in fact the court that should have ultimately 
heard the appeal (thus making it constitutionally proper and clearly fitting 
within the range of Scenario One), Lockett and Warner first made a filing 
for the matter on February 26, 2014.148 Yet the supreme court did not 
decide to fully assert its jurisdiction until April 21, 2014.149 This means that 
for nearly two full months, the case was in jurisdictional limbo, while a 
bevy of motions, briefs, and hearings occurred before multiple courts, not to 
mention the rising legal fees.150 And this must assuredly be one of the 
faster, more efficient examples in Oklahoma, as the court was operating 
under an all-too-literal deadline.151  
But even so, this situation fails to meet the mark of efficiency.152 While 
it is true that this time around the desired results were accomplished, it was 
not done without waste. The impossibly convoluted sidebar that occurred 
over the two months before the Oklahoma Supreme Court accepted 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. at 655-56. 
 146. Inefficient, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic 
tionary/inefficient (last visited Sept. 1, 2016). 
 147. Lockett 2, 2014 OK CR 3, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d 755, 755 (noting that the recent procedural 
history of the case is “lengthy and requires repeating for clarity”). 
 148. Id. ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755-56. 
 149. Lockett 3, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 15, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curium) (mem. opin.) (deciding 
to issue a stay of execution). 
 150. See Lockett 2, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755 (describing the procedural history of the case); 
see also Lockett 3, ¶¶ 4-8, 356 P.3d at 59-60 (also detailing the procedural history). 
 151. Lockett 3, ¶ 6, 356 P.3d at 59-60 (noting that the execution date for one of the 
petitioners was set at the time for April 22, note also that this memorandum opinion finally 
deciding to grant a stay was decided on April 21). 
 152. See Inefficient, supra note 146. 
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jurisdiction still represented a period where litigants were spending time 
and money on issues not related to the merits of their case.153  
Furthermore, the analysis to this point has only centered on the parties to 
the litigation, and said nothing of the systemic effects. The judicial system 
is necessarily one of finite resources as there are only so many judges, 
courtrooms, and hours in a day.154 Therefore, each time that a jurisdictional 
dispute is prolonged in this manner, time is being spent that could be going 
to other parties with meritorious claims. And while this wrong is grave in 
economic terms, it also has constitutional implications. As the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court recognized in Lockett, the Oklahoma Constitution demands 
that the courts shall provide a “certain remedy . . . without . . . delay” to 
“every person . . . for every wrong.”155 This certainly seems to imply that 
delivering justice in a timely and efficient manner is a constitutional 
guarantee to the citizens of the state. 
This is not to say that resolving this particular problem entails a solution. 
In fact, it may be impossible to always provide an outcome that is optimal 
from both a structural and efficiency perspective in any certain terms.156 
Yet, if there is an acceptable solution from a structural standpoint that is 
more efficient, then the inefficient aspects of the current state of 
jurisdictional determinations—and their effects on the entire system—
cannot be ignored.157 
B. Control of the Litigants 
In civil litigation, forum selection is frequently regarded as the most 
important strategic decision that a party will make.158 This importance goes 
beyond the mere geographic location of the court and extends to 
determining what substantive and procedural law will apply.159 These 
considerations are particularly relevant here, as whether a party ends up 
before the Oklahoma Supreme Court or the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See Lockett 2, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755-56 (describing the procedural history of the 
case); see also Lockett 3, ¶¶ 4-8, 356 P.3d at 59-60 (also detailing the procedural history). 
 154. McIntyre v. K-Mart Corp., 794 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 155. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (emphasis added); Lockett 3, ¶ 11, 356 P.3d at 61 (quoting 
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6). 
 156. Buehler, supra note 123, at 667 (describing structural and efficiency values as 
incommensurable, and thus impossible to analyze from a cost-benefit perspective). 
 157. Id. at 665-66. 
 158. Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy 
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 55 (2009). 
 159. Id. 
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Appeals will dictate whether Oklahoma civil or criminal procedure 
applies.160  
There are many varying perspectives on exactly how much control 
litigants should have to select their forum.161 It seems to be a fundamental 
matter of fairness, however, that, as much as possible, parties should be 
able to foresee the effects of certain actions that they take in their case. That 
is, even if they cannot cherry-pick which court will hear their case, litigants 
should not be totally in the dark about where they should file an appeal.  
For example, imagine an individual who has been convicted of a crime in 
Oklahoma and believes she has an appeal on some civil claim regarding her 
trial or conviction. The individual takes her case to an attorney who has vast 
experience arguing such claims before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The 
attorney agrees that the supreme court is the proper forum for the case to be 
decided; in fact, it has decided such cases before. To the attorney’s surprise, 
however, the supreme court decides this time that the court of criminal 
appeals should have jurisdiction over the matter.162 Now, much of the 
preparation to appear before the supreme court has gone to waste, not to 
mention the very real possibility that the attorney has never appeared before 
the court of criminal appeals before, leaving the client in a particularly 
awkward and frustrating situation (and potentially raising ethical 
considerations for the attorney).163 While this situation always remains a 
potential outcome, it should be limited as much as possible so that parties 
can have certainty in results, which in turn will allow them to make better 
decisions regarding their cases. 
C. Rule of Law 
Concededly, the phrase “rule of law” has become somewhat of a loaded 
term.164 Attempts to reconcile conceptions of the term with modern legal 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See State ex rel. Coats v. Hunter, 1978 OK CR 57, ¶ 3, 580 P.2d 158, 159 (stating 
that the law of civil procedure does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings, which are 
considered criminal in Oklahoma). 
 161. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 158. 
 162. Recall, “a hard-and-fast rule would not serve the ends of justice.” Movants to Quash 
Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, n.1, 184 P.3d 546, 548-49. 
 163. See Hunter, ¶ 3, 580 P.2d at 159 (stating that the law of civil procedure does not 
apply to habeas corpus proceedings, which are considered criminal in Oklahoma); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 164. See Richard H. Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (describing invocations of the Rule of Law as 
often “smug or hortatory,” and as increasingly having “acquired either defensive or 
accusatory tones”); Major Tonya L. Jankunis, Military Strategists Are from Mars, Rule of 
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and political underpinnings, however, are beyond the scope of this article. 
Here, it is sufficient to note that the Rule of Law embodies an ideal that 
serves three primary purposes, as proposed by Richard Fallon.165 First, the 
Rule of Law stands as a dike between civilization and anarchy.166 Second, 
the Rule of Law allows individuals to have enough predictive information 
about a society in order to arrange their affairs.167 And finally, the Rule of 
Law, to some extent, protects against “official arbitrariness.”168 That is, at 
its core, the Rule of Law stands in direct juxtaposition to the “rule of men” 
in order that “those applying the law, as much as those to whom it is 
applied, can be bound by it.”169 Further, Fallon proposes five elements that 
must be present in order to realize the ideals of the Rule of Law.170 They are 
as follows: 
1) The first element is the capacity of legal rules, standards, or 
principles to guide people in the conduct of their affairs. People 
must be able to understand the law and comply with it. 
2) The second element of the Rule of Law is efficacy. The law 
should actually guide people, at least for the most part. In Joseph 
Raz's phrase, “people should be ruled by the law and obey it.” 
3) The third element is stability. The law should be reasonably 
stable, in order to facilitate planning and coordinated action over 
time. 
4) The fourth element of the Rule of Law is the supremacy of legal 
authority. The law should rule officials, including judges, as well 
as ordinary citizens. 
5) The final element involves instrumentalities of impartial justice. 
Courts should be available to enforce the law and should employ 
fair procedures.171 
                                                                                                                 
Law Theorists Are from Venus: Why Imposition of the Rule of Law Requires a Goldwater-
Nichols Modeled Interagency Reform, 197 MIL. L. REV. 16, 29 (2008) (noting that “[t]he 
rule of law has become ubiquitous to the point of becoming slippery”). 
 165. Fallon, supra note 164, at 7-8. 
 166. Id. at 7. 
 167. Id. at 7-8. 
 168. Id. at 8. 
 169. Id. at 3. 
 170. Id. at 8-9. 
 171. Id. (quoting Joseph Rax, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 224 (1979)). 
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In applying these elements to Oklahoma, it appears the current system 
comes up short. As for the first and second elements, the supreme court’s 
jurisprudence lacks clear standards and thus does not guide decision 
making.172 Third, the law does not allow for planning and coordination of 
activities.173 Fourth, it would seem that the current system does not control 
judges because decisions are made independent of any other standard, 
which gives the appearance of arbitrariness, at a minimum.174 Finally, the 
fifth element is at least partially not met as courts may potentially be 
unavailable to litigants with meritorious claims.175  
Even so, it would be the most uncouth of hyperboles to suggest that the 
issue discussed in this article risks the collapse of Rule of Law in Oklahoma 
entirely. Moreover, reasonable minds can differ in consideration of the 
effects of such principles in any instance.176 Nevertheless, these concerns, 
when combined with those of efficiency and control of litigants, are severe 
enough that they need to be protected from erosion, however slight, 
wherever possible. 
V. Solutions 
In analyzing options to resolve some of these issues, potential solutions 
can be categorized by the actor that must engage in them. Here, the saving 
grace must either come from the hand of the state legislature or that of the 
state judiciary. While legislative options are worth considering, action by 
the judiciary seems to be the best solution, as argued further below. 
A. Legislative Options 
If the legislature acts, it has three basic courses available to follow: (1) 
dissolve the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, (2) change the structure 
of the relationship between the court of criminal appeals and the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, or (3) further define through statute what is criminal and 
what is civil. Each of these has some appeal, but also some drawbacks. 
                                                                                                                 
 172. See Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, n.1, 184 P.3d 
546, 548-49. 
 173. See supra Section IV.B. 
 174. See supra Part II. 
 175. See supra Part III (Scenario Seven). 
 176. Fallon, supra note 164, at 9 (stating that there is disagreement as to what sorts of 
departures from the Rule of Law are objects of concern, also noting that even a generally 
effective legal system can include regulations or decisions that do not comply with the Rule 
of Law). 
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First, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals could be dissolved 
entirely. While this seems an unlikely option, it would actually not take a 
great amount of action on the part of the legislature. Recall that the court of 
criminal appeals was created by statute, not the state constitution.177 While 
the constitution recognizes the court of criminal appeals, it only grants the 
court equal appellate jurisdiction with the supreme court “until otherwise 
provided by statute.”178 Therefore, all the legislature would have to do is 
amend or repeal title 20, section 40 of the Oklahoma Statutes, resulting in 
Oklahoma having one intermediate court of appeal and one court of last 
resort—putting it in line with the vast majority of other states in that 
respect.179 If this course of action were followed, the problems created by 
the gap in appellate jurisdiction between the two courts would be 
completely eliminated as the supreme court would be the single, ultimate 
judicial authority in Oklahoma, removing the possibility of disagreement 
between it and the court of criminal appeals.180 
Of course, the court of criminal appeals has greater utility than that 
solution would suggest.  It provides specialization in addition to relieving 
some of the supreme court’s case load, purposes which are beneficial and 
not to be taken lightly. Moreover, the mere fact that Oklahoma is somewhat 
unique in this structure is by no means enough to justify changing it—after 
all, states are to be laboratories of democracy.181 Further, the switching 
costs of transferring the entire docket of the court of criminal appeals would 
be significant. To mention just a few of the abundant headaches that could 
result, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals and supreme court may not 
have the infrastructure to deal with the influx on their dockets; variances in 
procedural timelines and rules would have to be accounted for; litigants in 
pending cases would have to make numerous adjustments to logistics and 
potentially to strategy as well. Therefore this solution—although perhaps 
intriguing and definitely effective—seems overbroad. 
Second, similar to the previous option, the legislature could amend the 
statute that created the court of criminal appeals to change its status from a 
                                                                                                                 
 177. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011); see supra Part II. 
 178. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4; supra Part II. 
 179. See State Court Organization, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://data.ncsc. 
org/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=Public%20App/SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewi
sa&anonymous=true (last visited Feb. 26, 2017). 
 180. See supra Section III.C. 
 181. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that denial of the right of the states to experiment in economic and 
social issues might be costly). 
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co-equal superior court to an inferior court underneath the umbrella of the 
supreme court, on a level equal with the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals. 
This would simply create alternate paths that an appeal could travel before 
reaching the supreme court. Such a system is similar to that adopted by 
Alabama and is therefore not without precedent.182 This solution would also 
eliminate issues with the current system in that the supreme court would 
have coextensive jurisdiction with the court of criminal appeals while also 
clearly being the superior court. That is, the supreme court would have 
authority to hear every case, whether or not the court of criminal appeals 
did. Therefore, regardless of whether a litigant’s case would be heard at the 
intermediate level by the court of civil appeals or the court of criminal 
appeals, it would clearly be able to be heard by the supreme court. Again, 
this would eliminate issues by removing the potential for disagreements 
over jurisdiction between the two courts.183  
This solution seems more effective than dissolving the court of criminal 
appeals entirely. It would limit—albeit not eliminate—some of the 
switching costs and would still allow for maximization of the court of 
criminal appeals’ specialization, just at a different stage in the process. 
Such a solution may be a less efficient distribution, however, as it would 
still increase the supreme court’s docket and would still have some amount 
of switching costs. 
Moreover, as was the problem with dissolving the court of criminal 
appeals entirely, the problems of efficiency, control of the litigants, and 
Rule of Law are not necessarily inherent in a system of two courts of last 
resort. The problem is not necessarily that Oklahoma has such a system, but 
the way it implements such a system. The structure is not entirely meritless 
in and of itself. Therefore, this solution is also overbroad in that it 
unnecessarily changes the entire system.  
Third, the legislature could amend title 20, section 40 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes, which gives the court of criminal appeals broad jurisdiction over 
“criminal cases,”184 to include a definition of that term. This would provide 
more consistency by at least giving a baseline to determine in which court a 
particular issue belongs. This solution rightfully does not entirely remove 
decision-making authority from the judiciary, however, as no matter how 
particular the legislature believes its definition is, there will necessarily be 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 140-141 (creating a Supreme Court with the highest 
authority but also the intermediate courts of civil and criminal appeals with jurisdiction set 
by law and rules of the Supreme Court). 
 183. See supra Section III.C. 
 184. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011). 
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some level of ambiguity that must be resolved through an interpretation by 
the supreme court.185 This still represents an improvement by adding some 
articulable standard outside of the judiciary that the supreme court can be 
held to, thus making it harder for the court to silently violate the 
constitution.186 There would still remain, however, issues with the supreme 
court’s jurisprudence on its own. Therefore, this solution would narrow the 
magnitude of the problem, but not entirely eliminate it.  
Texas provides an example of a clearer structure for determining 
jurisdiction between two courts. Texas also has a supreme court and a court 
of criminal appeals that are courts of last resort.187 As in Oklahoma, the 
Supreme Court of Texas has jurisdiction over all cases, except for criminal 
law matters.188 Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has 
jurisdiction in all criminal matters.189 But while the Texas Constitution does 
not directly say how conflicts between the two courts are to be handled, it 
still drastically narrows the potential for conflicts by its structure. First, 
generally all appeals, civil or criminal, are handled by the intermediate 
courts of appeals.190 Any further issues in a civil matter will then go before 
the Texas Supreme Court.191 In a criminal matter, the appeal will be to the 
court of criminal appeals, which the court can accept or deny at its 
discretion.192 Further, the court of criminal appeals may issue an order on 
its own to review the decision of the court of appeals.193  
This one feature eliminates the potential for the two courts to disagree 
about jurisdiction, which is one problem with Oklahoma’s current 
system.194 In effect, this means that the court of criminal appeals cannot be 
forced to take any cases it does not want to hear, either by the parties to a 
case or by the Supreme Court of Texas. Of the suboptimal scenarios 
discussed in Part II, this feature alone eliminates the potential for three of 
the five suboptimal scenarios—specifically Scenarios Five, Six, and Seven. 
Those three scenarios, all involving one court being forced to hear a case it 
previously stated it did not have jurisdiction over, are now impossible for 
two reasons. First, it is impossible for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 8, 145 P.3d 1040, 1044-45; supra Part II. 
 186. See supra Part III. 
 187. See State Court Organization, supra note 179. 
 188. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). 
 189. Id. § 5(a). 
 190. Id. § 6(a). 
 191. Id. § 3(a). 
    192.  Id. § 5(b). 
 193. Id.  
 194. See supra Section III.C. 
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to have to deny having jurisdiction of a case, since it can only move to take 
cases it has already established it has jurisdiction over.195 Second, unlike 
Oklahoma, even if the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did theoretically 
determine it did not have jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Texas does not 
have the opportunity to attempt to force jurisdiction upon it.196 
Additionally, the Texas Constitution states that an appeal can bypass the 
court of appeals and go directly to the court of criminal appeals if the case 
is one “in which the death penalty has been assessed.”197 While the point of 
this section is presumably to eliminate some bureaucratic red tape by 
creating a fast track for death-penalty cases, the effect is clear that if the 
death penalty has been assessed in the underlying case, then the appeal 
clearly belongs in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The combination 
of these two facets of the Texas Constitution creates a limited potential for 
jurisdictional conflicts. 
The possibility remains, however, that the supreme court will try to take 
an appeal of what is actually a criminal case or that the court of criminal 
appeals will move to hear what is actually a civil case (Scenarios Two and 
Four as discussed in Part III). Of course, if a court wants to act 
unconstitutionally and take a case that it does not have jurisdiction over, 
little can be done about it at the time. The effect can only be retroactive in 
not giving force, precedential or otherwise, to the opinion.198 A greater 
danger, however, lies in the close cases where it is not entirely clear which 
court has jurisdiction. Therefore, the more cases where jurisdiction is 
unclear, the greater the danger. And while these cases can perhaps never 
entirely be eliminated, they can be narrowed by the creation of an 
ascertainable standard, something the Texas Constitution has done for 
death-penalty cases. 
B. Judicial Options 
Because of the preceding, the most effective answer has to come from 
the judiciary itself, as it is the heart of the problem. Specifically, as shown 
above in Part II, the supreme court relies on an ad hoc approach to deciding 
whether it or the court of criminal appeals should have jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                                 
 195. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(b). 
 196. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 197. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(b). 
 198. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 
2009); see also supra Part III. 
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deciding each time on a “case-by-case basis.”199 Such an approach is based 
in flexibility, allowing the law to be formed and changed as needed, and is 
regularly identified as the American way of solving legal issues.200 While 
effective in many situations, it is not the only path, nor is it necessarily 
always the right path to take.201 In addition to flexibility, competing norms 
of consistency and predictability are also necessary to effective lawmaking 
as they too are essential to basic underpinnings of fairness, and indeed in 
certain situations are even paramount to flexibility.202 Laws with these latter 
characteristics, however, cannot be achieved through ad hoc decision 
making, but require clear, articulable standards.203 The effective jurist 
therefore recognizes the need for both sorts of law making—ad hoc 
decisions and intelligible standards—to be available in his toolbox. The 
difficulty comes in determining which instances call for the implementation 
of what type of rule.  
For example, Professor Roger Dworkin argues that the flexible nature 
developed by the Supreme Court of the United States in its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence is inappropriate for those circumstances.204 
Primarily, this is because police search and seizure techniques are not 
everyday occurrences and can hardly be expected to be easily attainable to 
the general public.205 Therefore, if the judiciary attempts to make these 
decisions without any sort of hard standard, there is “a void into which 
attempts to influence are bound to rush.”206 That is, it is possible for ad hoc 
decisions not grounded in reasonableness to become decided more on the 
whims of judges rather than sound legal reasoning.207 Moreover, while 
remedies of police atrocities is the purpose of the due process clause, the 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grant Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7, 
184 P.3d 546, 548.  
 200. Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits 
of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 364-65 (1973). 
 201. See id. at 365 (noting that “the utility of [factual adjudication] has limits”). 
 202. Id. 
 203. The Oklahoma Supreme Court itself implicitly recognizes this dichotomy, it simply 
comes out the other way, arguing that in this situation, a case-by-case determination is 
appropriate because “a hard and fast rule would not serve the ends of justice.” Dixon, ¶ 7, 
n.1, 184 P.3d at 549. 
 204. Dworkin, supra note 200, at 365. 
 205. Id. at 366. 
 206. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 104 (1967). 
 207. See LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (describing 
how, in the context of administrative agencies, over-flexible standards such as the “totality 
of the circumstances" test can turn into rationalizing whatever decision the agency desires). 
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purpose of search and seizure law under the Fourth Amendment is to 
control police conduct, forcing them to respect individual rights.208 
Therefore, if that goal is to be attainable, there is a natural need for 
predictable and consistent norms to which police can actually conform their 
conduct, a situation that cannot be reached through ad hoc decision 
making.209  
So, the question then becomes whether the ad hoc, case-by-case 
jurisprudence adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court is appropriate in 
determining whether a claim is civil or criminal. Based on the factors 
examined above, it does not seem to be. First, consider the nature of the 
acts involved. Defining whether a legal issue is criminal or civil seems to be 
inherently conceptual. Unlike negligence, it is not something we can 
measure based on common, everyday experiences. Rather, it is a legal 
construct created to better categorize and understand different types of legal 
problems. Therefore, there is a greater danger with ad hoc decisions that the 
tail will wag the dog, meaning that a court will decide whether it wants 
jurisdiction over a case or not, and then will create whatever rule is 
necessary to make the particular facts criminal or civil as desired. 
Moreover, while perhaps the designation of criminal or civil in itself is not 
an important issue, it has profound impacts on the efficiency of the case and 
the situations of the parties.210 
Secondly, the nature of what the law is trying to accomplish also pushes 
away from ad hoc decision making. In distinguishing between civil and 
criminal to determine jurisdiction, courts clearly are not providing a remedy 
to right a past wrong, as in negligence. Instead, jurisdictional arguments are 
somewhat extra-litigation as they are outside the context of the merits of the 
case. Therefore, since the common conception is that jurisdictional disputes 
should be limited as much as possible,211 this leads even more strongly to 
the idea that there should be a clear standard rather than ad hoc decision 
making here. Without a clear standard, ad hoc decision making usually 
leads to more issues being litigated, as it is easier to find potential 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Dworkin, supra note 200, at 365-66. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See supra Part IV. 
 211. See Buehler, supra note 123, at 679-80 (arguing that jurisdictional litigation has 
value in deterring other parties from transcending jurisdictional boundaries and promoting 
values of federalism and separation of powers; when these values are not present, such 
litigation is inefficient). 
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ammunition for any legal argument.212 And while this is a good thing when 
remedies are being provided because the law seeks to provide remedies for 
those who deserve them, in the jurisdictional situation, the incentive is in 
the opposite direction: to limit disputes.213 Therefore, a clearer standard 
would better achieve this goal by eliminating some potential arguments, 
thus making jurisdictional lines clearer and enhancing the ability to focus 
on the merits of the case.214 This is especially true when, as in Lockett, the 
death penalty is on the line and the defendant in the original case has 
nothing to lose and everything to gain by extending the case for as long as 
possible. Moreover, the supreme court is trying to control conduct at some 
level, even though it is just the conduct of itself and the court of criminal 
appeals, rather than a third party. Put differently, jurisdiction is power and 
the power of the courts needs to be legitimate to enhance Rule of Law 
principles.215 Therefore, it makes more sense to make those decisions based 
on an ascertainable standard, especially when one of the potential 
beneficiaries is the party making the decisions.  
For such standards, two basic options provide workable solutions to 
determine jurisdiction. The heart of the problem with Oklahoma’s current 
jurisprudence is not that it has failed to recognize either of these solutions, 
but that through its ad hoc decision making it has employed them both 
haphazardly on different occasions. First, if the appeal arises out of or 
relates back to a case that was prosecuted by the State, then the appeal 
belongs in the court of criminal appeals.216 Such a standard would be easy 
to apply. If an appeal to a higher court involves a stay or injunction, it is 
unclear on its surface and could go either way. If in the underlying case, 
however, the injunction references a nuisance claim from one private 
citizen against another private citizen, or even against the government, then 
that appeal would clearly be a civil case that belongs in the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma. But, if in the underlying case the injunction references a 
private citizen being prosecuted by the government for a violation of the 
criminal code of Oklahoma, then it is very intuitively a criminal case and 
belongs in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.  
                                                                                                                 
 212. See Dworkin, supra note 200, at 367 (arguing that, in the Fourth Amendment 
context, “adopting forthright, inflexible rules . . . may avoid much useless, expensive, and 
frustrating litigation engendered by the current chaos, which appears to offer hope of 
escaping conviction to countless criminals”). 
 213. See Buehler, supra note 123, at 679-80. 
 214. See Dworkin, supra note 200, at 367.  
 215. See supra Part IV. 
 216. Similar to that used in the In re M.B. line of cases. See supra Part II. 
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One potential argument against such an approach is that it puts too much 
weight on the criminal side of the scale. In one sense, this would give more 
power to the court of criminal appeals, as it would potentially have the 
ability to hear more cases than it currently does. The standard is not 
overbroad, however, in the sense that anything with a hint of criminality 
would automatically get shipped to the court of criminal appeals by default. 
For example, imagine a citizen of Oklahoma charged with murder. As a 
part of his defense, the citizen seeks to exclude evidence on the grounds 
that a search by the police violated Oklahoma search and seizure law. 
Separately, the citizen also brings some sort of due process claim against 
the police for that same violation. On appeal of the former case, the legal 
issue would arise out of the actual trial prosecuting the citizen for murder. 
Therefore, it would be criminal. But, the latter appeal would not merely get 
swept up in the criminality just because it is related to the same set of 
factual circumstances. Rather, the due process claim would be civil because 
even if the government had never prosecuted the citizen, he would still have 
access to the due process cause of action for the potentially illegal search. 
Therefore, it is independent, does not arise from the prosecution, and is a 
civil case, thus belonging in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Applied to 
Lockett, this standard would greatly enhance clarity. Lockett and Warner’s 
appeals both arose out of criminal prosecutions, and therefore would be 
under the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.217 
The second available solution is to examine whether the appeal itself 
actually asserts a civil or criminal right.218 This solution achieves a more 
balanced distribution of cases, in that more civil claims would end up 
before the supreme court and more criminal claims would be distributed to 
the court of criminal appeals. This same feature would also increase the 
specialization benefits of having two courts of last resort. Using the same 
example as above, the outcome would be the same, albeit for different 
reasons. The due process claim would still find its way onto the docket of 
the supreme court because it asserts a civil right, while the court of criminal 
appeals would still preside over the challenge to the search and seizure 
provision, as that is a criminal right.  
One problem with this solution is that, while it works well in easy areas, 
it does less in tougher cases. Defining something as a civil or criminal right 
makes sense for those rights that one commonly thinks of in those terms, 
                                                                                                                 
 217. See Warner v. State, 2006 OK CR 40, ¶ 2, 144 P.3d 838, 856; Lockett 1, 2002 OK 
CR 30, ¶ 1, 53 P.3d 418, 421. 
 218. Similar to that used in the Dancy line of cases. See supra Part II. 
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but for something more questionable, or for a novel question that has not 
yet been put into one of those categories, this method uses the term 
attempted to be defined in the definition itself. Thus, some inherent 
ambiguity persists.  
Further, even in clearer cases, this approach creates difficulties when an 
appeal includes more than one type of right. In this instance, it becomes 
unclear whether the case should be split or stay together. The supreme court 
was faced with this question in Lockett, as the appeal regarding the 
confidentiality of the state’s death-penalty procedures seemed to assert a 
civil right, but the claim for a stay of injunction appeared to assert a 
criminal right.219 In Lockett, the supreme court decided to split the cases, 
holding on to the civil constitutional claim while transferring the criminal 
request for an injunction to the court of criminal appeals.220 This proved 
problematic, however, as the court of criminal appeals was put in the 
interesting situation of having to hear a case for a remedy without being 
able to hear the underlying case. That is, how could it grant or deny a stay 
of execution without making an implicit statement about the merits of the 
inmates’ civil appeal, which was not before it to decide?221 The other 
solution, to keep the claims together, is no more appealing. In that case, the 
supreme court would be put in the unenviable position of deciding whether 
the appeal was more civil or more criminal, in effect trying to determine 
which issue is more important—a determination that could hardly be 
objectively made.  
Because of these issues, it seems that the former standard could be more 
effective. Either standard employed consistently, however, will capture the 
benefits of increased stability and efficacy in the appellate structure. 
Therefore, more important than which standard is chosen, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court should realize that commitment to a singular, articulable 
standard instead of its current ad hoc approach will enhance the 
predictability and consistency of its jurisprudence. 
VI. Conclusion 
Gaps currently exist within the system of appellate jurisdiction in 
Oklahoma and that will likely always be the case. But here, a step in the 
right direction may be taken at a relatively small cost. If the standard 
advocated here existed during the appeals of Lockett and Warner, the 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Lockett 3, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 3, 356 P.3d 58, 59 (per curium) (mem. opin.). 
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situation would have been clear. As the appeal arose from the prosecution 
of both men, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would clearly have 
had the authority to issue the stays necessary to hear the appeals on the 
merits. Over two months of labor, anxiety, and judicial resources would 
have been saved. Such a step, however slight, would increase the 
efficiency, efficacy, and respectability of the legal system in Oklahoma. 
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